Al-‘Afif Al-Akhdhar (Tunisian columnist), July 21, 2002.
Transalation by MEMRI, the Middle East Media Research Institute, an
independent, non-profit organization that translates and analyzes the media of
the Middle East.
The Missed Opportunity of July 2000 and Its Consequences
“My generation opened its eyes with the loss of Palestine, and is about to shut
them with the loss of the opportunity to retrieve what can be retrieved from it.
No doubt, the Palestinian issue is the mother of all our issues, and its solution
depends upon the possibility of bringing our societies to modernization, which
in turn, is for us a matter of ’to be or not to be…'”
“Until 2000, the solution was within reach. But the Palestinian leaders refused
to extend it a hand. This was the last costly missed opportunity to get back the
land, and with it a measure of honor that would have been sufficient to heal our
wound, which has bled since our defeat by Napoleon in 1798 and more since
we were defeated by Ben-Gurion in 1948.”
“Clinton presented proposals to the Palestinian leaders on a golden platter, and
they answered him with an Intifada of armed struggle and suicide bombings – in
an era when these are no longer appropriate. Thus, at one blow, we lost
the land … and our reputation. The occupation army returned
and in everyone’s eyes our image was tarnished by egotism unprecedented in
our history.”
‘The Vast Majority of Arab Intellectuals, the Arab Street, and 80% of the
Palestinians – Supported Suicide Attacks’
“…Before our suicide operations against Israeli citizens, our image was one of
men struggling for liberty.
But when the most important Palestinian organizations – among them
Fatah – became involved , and when the vast majority of
Arab intellectuals, the Arab street, and 80% of the Palestinians – supported
them, we were slapped with an image of a suicide who disdains life –
his life and the lives of others.”
“When we lost the media war, our back was exposed to Sharon, who gave it a
military and political knockout with the ‘Defensive Wall’ war, and then with
‘Determined Path.’
Thus, defeated, the Palestinian and Arab street submitted to bitterness
over their fate, as happened on the morning of the 1967 defeat.”
Comparing the First Intifada to the Second
“It is reasonable to assume that now the Arab-Israeli conflict, and primarily the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, will be resolved … by coercion and humiliation – on
the basis of the current balance of power.”
“We, the majority of the elite and the public, welcomed the Oslo Accord despite
its modest , because it was the jewel in the crown of the victory of the
Intifada of the ‘Children of the Stones,’ that reshaped the world consciousness
by inverting the symbol of the Israeli David and the Philistine Goliath
transferring the sling, for the first time in history, to the hands of a Palestinian
confronting an Israeli tank.”
“, the probable solution reflects the result of the defeat of the Intifada of
the Suicide Bombings, which has killed two birds with one stone: it wiped
out the first Intifada’s political-symbolic achievements; it revived and
then dashed hopes in the Palestinian and Arab street, only to bring back the
occupation…”
Arab Responses to Defeats – Historical Observations
“Historically speaking, elites have responded to defeats in two
ways. a creative response to challenge, as the elites in Japan
and Germany did in the 19th and 20th century when they opened up to
modernization in the economy, politics, sciences, and philosophy, in a way
unprecedented in their national autocratic history. a
conceptual introversion within these nations’ identity in which emotionalism
overrode rationalism…”
“Our reaction to repeated defeats over the past two centuries was as follows: After every defeat, we became
less courageous in asking painful questions, and more deeply mired
in the culture of finding excuses, placing responsibility for our defeats on the
unknown and settling for complaining about the trap laid by the West and its
‘stepdaughter’ Israel, who have targeted our land and skies.”
“All this without us asking the embarrassing
question of whether internal factors have made us, unlike all other nations, easy
prey to all. The elites have opted for … denying their overwhelming
responsibility for these defeats.”
“The Algerian prince Abd Al-Qader was responsible for the defeat of his people
by the French occupation, because he preferred a religious ruling
issued by the Mufti of Fas and opted for suicide and Jihad, to the
last of his men, rejecting the proposal to divide Algeria between him and the
occupiers and to wait for better days when it would be possible to regain the
usurped part as cheaply as possible.
‘Urabi chose hopeless resistance over negotiations with the conquerors which
could have reduced losses. Arafat tore up Clinton’s proposals and rode the Intifada of the Suicide Bombers, only to lead his people to a dead
end.”
The Palestinian ‘Failure Neurosis’
“What caused these leaders, primarily the Palestinians among them, to lead
their peoples to perdition?”
“ it is the ‘Failure Neurosis’ that compelled them to do everything
within their power to punish themselves and their peoples with failure where
success was certain. Their ‘Failure Neurosis’ has several symptoms:”
“Conceptual Stagnation, making them incapable – at every stage of the struggle
– of reading the regional and international balance of powers, and incapable of
drawing the necessary conclusions, so as to make a political and military
decision in keeping with the situation.”
“Political Backwardness, preventing them from changing their means of
struggle, way of thought, and goals which are not compatible with the political
changes. makes them resist the changeover of the
generations, in both the government and the opposition, and made them prefer
yes-men over knowledgeable people.”
“The Mania of the Armed Struggle, with all its terrible ramifications –
transforming the armed struggle from a means serving the ultimate goal of a
viable Palestinian state into a goal in and of itself.
This is the cause for the missing of historical opportunities since 1937 to
2000, with … pristine excuses such as ‘we have the right on our side’ and
’time, geography, and demography are working in our favor.'”
“Inability to Define the National Interest, Are we talking about the liberation of
Mandatory Palestine, or about regaining what can be salvaged of the Palestine
occupied in the 1967 war? What are the optimal means of armed
struggle for actualizing one of these two options? Are we talking about an
Intifada of armed struggle and suicide bombings, or about negotiations, or
about both – as maintained by Marwan Barghouti – in hope that this will place
the Sharon government between the rock of the Intifada and the hard place of
negotiations?”
“Perhaps the latter is the decision of the Palestinian leaders, but it does not
serve the national interest one iota. Like every improvisation, the
decision-making process that nations follow was not carried out . , taking on the opponent’s role so as to what his
counter-decisions will be. Thus, our decision is like those made out of mental
sloth.”
“Finally, a symptom of the ‘Failure Neurosis,’ which forces these Arab
leaders to act without knowing what their enemies want from them, is the
Prohibition on Free Internal Discussion and Moderate Discourse – which usually
arise from a serious analysis of the data. The verbal radicalism sweeping our
culture and the emotionally charged words … fills the vacuum created by the
lack of analysis and the vacuity of thought.”
“Words packed with content such as ‘rationalism,’ ‘moderation,’ and
‘concessions’ arouse horror. What meaning could concessions and interim
solutions have when compared to ’the sacred rights’ – which exist, of course,
only on paper?…”
Palestinian Leaders Have Handed Down a Death Sentence for Palestinian
Intelligence
“In reality, restoring is impossible – but reality is the last
thing that interests the bewitched way of thinking in which the value of words
equals their content.”
“Thus, these leaders have handed down a death sentence for Palestinian
intelligence. It is no accident that most critical Palestinian intellectuals have
preferred remaining outside the leadership; it is no accident that their proposals
do not resonate among . There is no doubt that this is one reason
for the absence of a Palestinian political program enjoying international trust…”
