Provided by the Government Press Office, July 1997
Executive Summary
Introduction
On January 15, 1997, Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) signed the Hebron Protocol, which outlined the security arrangements to be implemented after Israel’s redeployment. A Note for the Record, prepared by Ambassador Dennis Ross, was attached to the Hebron protocol. It contains a series of Israeli and Palestinian commitments and obligations.
Israeli Compliance
In the six months since the signing of the Hebron Accord, Israel has fulfilled all its commitments. Israeli forces redeployed in Hebron. Israel approved the first stage of the further redeployment from the West Bank, released Palestinian women prisoners, resumed negotiations with the PA on outstanding Interim Agreement issues, and offered to resume final status talks.
Palestinian Security Violations
The PA has violated the fundamental security provisions of the accord. The Palestinian police organized riots in Hebron in March-April 1997 and June-July 1997, and repeatedly failed to contain Palestinian rioters who surged towards the Jewish Quarter. The PA paid Palestinian youths 30 to 50 shekels per day for participating in riots and attacking Israeli soldiers. The PA has deployed 1,500 policemen in Hebron, nearly four times the 400 allowed, and armed them with weapons prohibited by the agreement.
Palestinian Violations of the Note for Record
The PA has also failed to fulfill any of its four obligations contained in the Note for the Record: amending the Covenant, combating terror, reducing the size of its police force to conform with the agreement, and restricting its governmental activity to areas under PA jurisdiction.
1. Failure to Change the PLO Covenant – The Palestinians have taken no steps toward completing the amendment process. No new version of the Covenant has yet been submitted to the Palestinian National Council.
2. Failure to Fight Terror and Prevent Violence – One of the PAâs gravest violations of the Note for the Record has been its failure to combat terror, an obligation the Note breaks down into six specific measures:
2a. Strengthening Security Cooperation – The PA broke off security cooperation with Israel earlier this year, despite warnings of impending terrorist activity. Palestinian security officials refused to meet Israeli counterparts and failed to exchange intelligence information. Recently, security cooperation has improved slightly, but the PA has refused to restore previous levels of cooperation.
2b. Incitement to Violence Against Israel – Senior PA officials have repeatedly engaged in incitement to violence against Israel. They have praised Hamas and the intifada, threatened Israel with war, and accused Israel of injecting Palestinians with the AIDS virus and poisoning Palestinian food products. More than 30 such statements made by senior PA officials are documented in the report.
2c. Combat Systematically and Effectively Terrorist Organizations and Infrastructure -The PA has taken no steps to outlaw terror groups, whose infrastructures remain intact. The PA Chairman gave a green light to terror groups to act. On the night of March 9, 1997, Arafat met with the heads of Hamas, the DFLP and the PFLP in Gaza, and signaled his consent for the renewal of acts of terrorism. Eleven days later, 3 Israelis died in a Hamas bombing in Tel Aviv on March 21, 1997.
In mid-July 1997 it became clear that the Palestinian police have been actively involved in terror. Israeli intelligence has confirmed that Asst.-Cmdr. Jihad Masimi of the PA police in Nablus has ordered attacks, that there are several terror cells in the Palestinian police, and that there are strong indications that Palestinian Police Chief Ghazi Jabali is involved.
2d. Apprehension, Prosecution and Punishment of Terrorists – Not a single terrorist has been tried by the PA for terror activity against Israel in the past 6 months. The PA has drafted numerous terrorists to serve in the ranks of the Palestinian security services, including at least 23 wanted for the murder of Israelis. The PA Police Commander has acknowledged that more than 150 members of Hamas and the PFLP are currently in key positions in the Palestinian police. Since the signing of the accord, the PA has conducted a “revolving door” policy and released dozens of terrorists from detention, including: Muhammad Khawaja, a senior Islamic Jihad leader who planned the January 1995 Beit Lid bombing; Nabil Sharihi, an Islamic Jihad member who helped prepare the bomb used in the April 1995 Kfar Darom attack in which 7 Israelis and 1 American were killed; Imjad Hinawi – a Hamas member who took part in the murder of 16-year old David Boim in Beit El in May 1996; and Muhammad Bathran, Islamic Jihad member responsible for a June 1996 terror attack in Bidiya in which off-duty Israeli policeman Meir Alush was killed.
2e. Transfer of Terror Suspects to Israel – On March 31, 1997, Israel submitted 31 requests to the PA for the transfer of terror suspects. Thus far, the PA has failed to hand over any of the suspects. Of the 31 terror suspects whose transfer is being sought by Israel, 11 are either serving in the Palestinian police or are in the process of joining its ranks. Among those being sought are: Ibrahim Alkam , Abdel Nasser Alkaisi and Ibrahim Hani, wanted for the murder of Etta Tzur and her 12-year old son Ephraim on December 11, 1996; Bassam Issa – involved in the terror attack on Yoel Solomon street in Jerusalem on October 9, 1994 in which two people were killed; and Hisham Salim Dib, who was behind the suicide bombing attack at Dizengoff Center on March 4, 1996 in which 13 people were killed.
2f. Confiscation of illegal firearms – No public campaigns have been undertaken by the PA to confiscate illegal weapons from individuals or groups, nor have any major sweeps been made to collect weapons. As a result, virtually none of the tens of thousands of weapons circulating in the autonomous areas have been collected by the PA in the past six months. Five illegally armed groups continue to operate in the areas under the PAâs control: 1) Hamas; 2) Islamic Jihad; 3) Fatah; 4) PFLP and 5) DFLP.
3. Size of Palestinian Police – The PA has deployed more than 30,000 policemen in the West Bank and Gaza, exceeding the agreed upon limit by over 6,000, or more than 25%.
4. Restriction of PA governmental activity to Areas Under its Control – The PA is active in Jerusalem in spheres ranging from education to health to religious affairs. Numerous PA offices such as the Orient House, the Religious Affairs Ministry and the Education Ministry are operating in the city. Plainclothesmen from four Palestinian security forces are currently active in the eastern part of the city, operating on its main thoroughfares and on the Temple Mount. They conduct detentions, intelligence-gathering, criminal investigations and enforce orders and instructions issued by PA Chairman Arafat.
